Table 1: The impact of generics entry on brand franchises varies across the US and 5EU markets 27
Table 2: Keppra received approval for several different indications and patient populations 136
Figure 1: Different stages of a drug lifecycle 18
Figure 2: Product lifecycles are getting shorter 19
Figure 3: A range of factors are impacting drug lifecycles 20
Figure 4: $102 billion worth of branded drugs from the top 50 Pharma companies face patent expiry from 2008 to 2012 21
Figure 5: Decline in the number of NMEs and new BLAs approved by the FDA, 1993–2006 22
Figure 6: Payers are introducing a range of measures designed to curb drug spending 23
Figure 7: Payers and governments have introduced a range of measures aimed at increasing generics use 24
Figure 8: Various factors impacting brand erosion at patent expiry 26
Figure 9: Entry of generic simvastatin resulting in significant reduction of Lipitor sales in Germany 29
Figure 10: Lifecycle management can have a different purpose 32
Figure 11: Early and mid-phase LCM strategies tend to have a two-fold effect on ROI 33
Figure 12: Late-phase strategies target sales in the mature and declining phases of a drug’s lifecycle 34
Figure 13: Developmental, commercial and legal LCM tactics 34
Figure 14: Depending on the stage of the lifecycle many or only few LCM strategies may be available 37
Figure 15: Key questions that need to be answered at each stage of the lifecycle 38
Figure 16: LCM strategy selection is a continuous process 40
Figure 17: A variety of functions need to be involved in the choice and design of LCM strategies 42
Figure 18: Marketing- versus development-driven LCM 43
Figure 19: A range of internal factors impact the company’s choice of LCM strategy 45
Figure 20: Resources required for different LCM strategies 47
Figure 21: Individual market characteristics impact LCM tactic selection 48
Figure 22: LCM strategies have varying levels of success depending on individual market conditions 49
Figure 23: Product characteristics also impact the choice of LCM tactics 51
Figure 24: Global versus local LCM – the focus changes across the product lifecycle 52
Figure 25: Commercial LCM strategies tend to have the greatest impact post-patent expiry 55
Figure 26: Success drivers and resistors of employing an own/authorized/licensed generic strategy 56
Figure 27: Authorized generics agreements can be either co-operative or competitive in nature 58
Figure 28: Pros and cons for generics companies of entering into authorized generic agreements 59
Figure 29: Pricing strategies at patent expiry 60
Figure 30: Success drivers and resistors of brand loyalty programs and increasing share of voice 62
Figure 31: Drivers and resistors of Rx-to-OTC switching 63
Figure 32: Drivers and resistors of Rx-to-OTC switching in the seven major markets 64
Figure 33: Advantages and disadvantages of divestiture as an LCM strategy 66
Figure 34: Success drivers and resistors of geographical expansion as an LCM tactic 67
Figure 35: Protected vs unprotected markets 68
Figure 36: Two types of unprotected markets exist 68
Figure 37: Routes for brand differentiation in unprotected markets 69
Figure 38: Developmental lifecycle management strategies can boost sales in both mid and late stages of the lifecycle 71
Figure 39: Reformulation and second generation products are developed with different aims depending on the stage of the lifecycle 73
Figure 40: Success drivers and resistors of reformulation as an LCM strategy 75
Figure 41: Success drivers and resistors of second generation product development and launch as an LCM strategy 76
Figure 42: Drivers and resistors of launching fixed dose combinations (FDCs) as an LCM strategy 76
Figure 43: Advantages and disadvantages of single or multiple indication FDCs 78
Figure 44: Success drivers and resistors to launching new delivery devices 81
Figure 45: Success drivers and resistors of indication expansion as an LCM strategy 82
Figure 46: Early versus late launch of new indication 83
Figure 47: Multiple options exist for indication expansion 84
Figure 48: Legal and regulatory strategies tend to extend the protected life of a drug 86
Figure 49: Success drivers and resistors of legal and regulatory LCM strategies 87
Figure 50: Critical considerations for legal and regulatory LCM strategies 89
Figure 51: The length of market exclusivity achievable in the US is different from the EU 91
Figure 52: UK sales of Fosamax suffered extensive generic erosion post patent expiry, Q4 2004–Q4 2007 98
Figure 53: Late launch of Fosavance resulted in failure to protect Merck & Co’s alendronate franchise in Germany, Q1 2005–Q4 2007 99
Figure 54: Fosavance proved to be a successful LCM strategy in France and Italy, Q1 2005–Q4 2007 100
Figure 55: Despite its late launch Fosavance achieved high sales in Spain, Q3 2005–Q4 2007 101
Figure 56: Fosamax Plus D was launched 3 years prior to patent expiry in the US, Q1 2005–Q4 2007 103
Figure 57: Novartis lost almost a half of its Lotrel sales (brand and own generic) after just one generic entrant 105
Figure 58: Biaxin XL proved to be a successful reformulation strategy for Abbott in the short term, 2003–07 107
Figure 59: Sanofi-Aventis focused most of its promotional efforts on Ambien CR following its launch, Q1 2005–Q4 2007 109
Figure 60: Ambien CR managed to retain some of Sanofi-Aventis’s Ambien franchise following generic entry, Q2 2005–Q4 2007 110
Figure 61: Fentora is only moderately successful in protecting Cephalon’s fentanyl franchise, Q2 2006–Q4 2007 113
Figure 62: Cephalon increased the price of Actiq to drive Fentora uptake 114
Figure 63: Cephalon directed all the promotional activities from Actiq to Fentora after its launch 115
Figure 64: Teva and Ranbaxy grabbed the biggest share of the generic simvastatin market despite Dr Reddy’s authorized generic, Q1 2006–Q4 2007 118
Figure 65: Pfizer’s own generic Zoloft diminished the impact of generics entry on the product franchise, Q1 2006–Q4 2007 120
Figure 66: Pfizer’s generic Zithromax was a success despite the lack of 180-days exclusivity for any generics player, 2005–07 123
Figure 67: Early entry enabled Winthrop to hold onto its share of market even after further generic companies entered the market, Q32003-Q42007 125
Figure 68: Purdue’s legal in resulted in return to growth for Oxycontin, Q4 2003–Q4 2007 128
Figure 69: Sales of Voltaren are still growing (2003-2007) 130
Figure 70: Novartis employed a range of commercial and development lifecycle management strategies for Voltaren 131
Figure 71: Zometa’s sales in the six major markets (2003-2007) 132
Figure 72: Aclasta had a strong uptake, especially in the US (2007) 133
Figure 73: Keppra’s sales are still growing even close to patent expiry 134
Figure 74: US sales of Boniva (2005-2007) 141
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